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JUDICIAL ADOPTION OF COMPARATIVE FAULT
IN NEW MEXICO: THE TIME IS AT HAND
JOSEPH GOLDBERG*

INTRODUCTION

Traditional tort principles establish that a defendant will not be
relieved of liability for the consequences of his negligence just because another person's negligence 1 combined with that of the defendant to cause the plaintiff's injury. 2 The common law has long recognized an exception to this rule. Where the plaintiff's injury is brought
about not just by the defendant's negligence but also by the plaintiffs negligence, the defendant is relieved completely of liability. 3
This exception, of course, describes the doctrine of contributory
negligence. 4 The traditional defense of contributory negligence has
long been and remains the law in New Mexico.'
The contributory negligence defense is rooted firmly in eighteenth
century ethical notions of individual liberty and responsibility and
the nineteenth century solicitude for and protection of capital investment in newly developing industries.6 Thus, the defense of contributory negligence may be viewed as a reflection of "the growth of an
individualistic political and economic philosophy which regarded as a
*Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. Of course, even if the concurrent cause is one of innocent origin, the same rule applies
and the negligent defendant will be held liable for any injuries sustained by the plaintiff. See
W. Prosser, Law of Torts §41, at 240-41 (4th ed. 1971); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§439 (1965).
2.
If the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs
injury, it follows that he will not be absolved from liability merely because
other causes have contributed to the result, since such causes, innumerable, are
always present. In particular, however, a defendant is not necessarily relieved
of liability because the negligence of another person is also a contributing
cause, and that other person, too, is to be held liable.
W. Prosser, Law of Torts §41, at 24041 (4th ed. 1971). The law in New Mexico is the
same. Srader v. Pecos Constr. Co., 71 N.M. 320, 327, 378 P.2d 364, 369 (1963); Crespin v.
Albuquerque Gas & Elec. Co., 39 N.M. 473, 478, 50 P.2d 259, 262 (1935).
3. Restatement (Second) of Torts § §463, 467 (1965).
4. See generally, W. Prosser, Law of Torts §65, at 416-17 (4th ed. 1971).
5. See, e.g., Moss v. Acuff, 57 N.M. 572, 573, 260 P.2d 1108, 1108 (1953); Werner v.
City of Albuquerque, 89 N.M. 272, 274, 550 P.2d 284, 286 (Ct. App. 1976).
6. Contributory negligence as an independent defense is generally traced to the case of
Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809). While antecedents to the
defense have been noted, see F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts §22.1, at 1195 (1956), it
seems not coincidental that the defense came to full flower at the point of transition from
eighteenth century ethics to nineteenth century economics.
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great social good freedom of action, in nearly all directions, particularly on the part of the entrepreneurial class."' A philosophy exalting individual liberty and responsibility certainly provided ample
justification for a rule that made a plaintiff bear the loss where the
injury was at least in part the plaintiff's fault. 8
While this philosophy of individual liberty and responsibility provided the climate for the advent of the contributory negligence
defense, the common law's protection of the developing industrial
revolution 9 explains the enthusiastic reception of contributory negligence into tort law.' 0 As one commentator explains:
Occasional holdings [of contributory negligence] in the United
States were based on the Butterfield v. Forrester doctrine commencing in the 1820s; but it was not until the rapid growth of railroad
transportation in the period from 1840-1900 that contributory negligence developed into the most commonly invoked defense in
negligence actions. Railroads represented substantial capital investments not to be intruded on by judgments on behalf of the injured
or dead.'

The contributory negligence defense has also been justified as a
7. F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts §22.1, at 1198 (1956). Harper and James go on
to describe how these eighteenth century ethical notions were refined to meet the particular
needs of the nineteenth century.
Freedom of action, as understood by the representative philosophers of
nineteenth century liberalism, meant freedom from state intervention-judicial
or legislative. And a dominant theme throughout their writings is the close
identification of material progress and industrial expansion with the laws of
nature and the hand of God .... Armed with a social philosophy which
relieved it of the care and responsibility for the less fortunate, flushed with
visions of an ever-expanding economy, and reassured by its philosophers of the
"righteousness" of their role in society, the entrepreneurial class, understandably enough, developed a certain impatience with legal obstacles to the continued march of industrial innovation.
Id. at 1198 n.22.
8. Harper and James have observed that while these ethical notions will support that part
of the contributory negligence defense which makes the plaintiffs fault a matter of relevant
concern in assessing the extent of liability, they do not support the "all-or-nothing" aspect
of the defense which completely bars the plaintiff from recovery. Id at 1198-99, 1207.
9.
The law developed in a way which the power-holders of the day considered
socially desirable. This way, in brief, was to frame rules friendly to the growth
of young businesses; or at least rules judges thought would foster such growth.
The rules put limits on enterprise liability. This was the thrust of the developing law of negligence ....
L. Friedman, A History of American Law 262 (1973); see also W. Prosser, Law of Torts
§65, at 418 (4th ed. 1971).
10. Friedman identifies the development and expansion of the defense of contributory
negligence with the expansion of the railroads in the United States. See L Friedman, note 9
supra, at 412-13;see also F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts §22.1, 1197-98 (1956).
11. 1 J. Dooley, Modern Tort Law § 4.05 (1977) (footnote omitted).
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reflection of judicial antagonism toward "plaintiff-minded" juries. 1 2
Juries made up of the plaintiff's neighbors were notoriously sympathetic to recovery by the plaintiff for injuries sustained at the hands
of foreign railroads. 1 3 The contributory negligence doctrine became
a potent tool for the judge to use in controlling the jury. As Friedman colorfully describes:
The basic idea of contributory negligence was extremely simple. If
the plaintiff was negligent himself, ever so slightly, he could not
recover from defendant. This was a harsh doctrine, but extraordinarily useful. It became the favored method, by which judges kept
tort claims from the deliberations of the jury. The trouble with the
jury was that pitiful cases of crippled men suing giant corporations
worked on their sympathies. Even men who respect general rules
find it hard to resist bending them in individual, touching cases,
particularly if victim or victim's next of kin stare into the jury box.
For jurors-amateurs all-every case was a onetime cause. Juries

showed a deep-dyed tendency to forget the facts that favored the
defendant, and find for the plaintiff in personal-injury cases. But if
the plaintiff was clearly negligent himself, there could be no recovfound, and the case could be taken
ery, there were no facts to1 be
4
from the jury and dismissed.
Finally, it has been suggested that the contributory negligence defense served to impose liability on the party who could prevent the
accident more efficiently in an economic sense.' s
It is clear that the contributory negligence defense was compatible
with the dominant social, ethical, and economic mores of the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, however, the doctrine has
not been without its critics.' 6 The criticism centers primarily on the
"all-or-nothing" aspect of the defense, which completely bars the
plaintiff from recovery where his fault, no matter how slight, contributes to the injury.' 7 Barring the plaintiff completely from recovery has been criticized as unduly harsh.' I Further, it has been sug12. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 111. L. Rev. 151, 156-58
(1946).
13. See F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts § 22.1, at 1198 (1956).
14. L. Friedman, A History of American Law 412 (1973).
15. R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, §6.3 (2d ed. 1977).
16. It seems fair to say that the doctrine is almost wholly discredited, at least among
academics. The list of law review articles and other scholarly works criticizing the doctrine is
too long to cite in full. The more influential articles include Green, llinois Negligence Law,
39 Ill. L. Rev. 36, 116, 197 (1944-1945); Leflar, The Declining Defense of Contributory
Negligence, 1 Ark. L. Rev. 1 (1946-1947); Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mich. L.
Rev. 465 (1953).
17. See, e.g., F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts § 22.3, at 1207-08 (1956).
18. See W. Prosser, Law of Torts §67, at 433 (4th ed. 1971); L. Green, Judge and Jury
119 (1930).
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gested that completely barring a plaintiff from recovery is not wholly
consistent with the underlying fault premise of negligence that one
should be responsible for one's own conduct.1 9 As a consequence of
the perceived harshness of the contributory negligence bar to recovery, the courts have employed a variety of devices to mitigate the
impact of the contributory negligence defense. 2 0 The doctrine of
last clear chance 2 1 is viewed as such a mitigating device. Moreover,
the courts have eliminated or substantially limited the defense of
contributory negligence in products liability actions,2 2 actions based
on the defendant's aggravated conduct,2 3 and other actions.2 4 Less
explicitly, the courts have also confined the contributory negligence
defense through hostility to summary judgment on the issue2" and
distortions in the application of proximate cause rules to contributory negligence.2 6
The comparative fault doctrine 2 7 represents the most explicit and
complete reaction against the classical contributory negligence defense. Like contributory negligence, comparative fault recognizes
that the plaintiffs misconduct is relevant to the issue of liability
arising from an accident. 2 S Unlike contributory negligence, however,
comparative fault abandons the "all-or-nothing" approach. Instead,
the fault of the plaintiff is compared with that of the defendant for
purposes of allocating the loss and dividing the damages. 2 9 Under
comparative fault, therefore, a plaintiffs negligence contributing to
the injury will not necessarily bar him from recovery. Rather, the
extent of the defendant's liability to the plaintiff will be confined to
that amount of the loss roughly attributable to the defendant's fault.
19. [T]here is no justification-in either policy or doctrine-for the rule of contributory negligence, except for the feeling that if one man is to be held liable
because of his fault, then the fault of him who seeks to enforce that liability
should also be considered. But this notion does not require the all-or-nothing
rule, which would exonerate a very negligent defendant for even the slight
fault of his victim.
F. Harper & F. James, Law of Torts § 22.3, at 1207 (1956).
20. See id. at 1207-41; V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence 5-9 (1974).
21. See generally W. Prosser, Law of Torts §66 (4th ed. 1971); F. Harper & F. James,
Law of Torts 1241-63 (1956).
22. Restatement (Second) of Torts, §484 (1965).
23. Id §482.
24. Id. §483; see Werner v. City of Albuquerque, 89 N.M. 272, 274, 550 P.2d 284, 286
(Ct. App. 1976).
25. See V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence 6-7 (1974).
26. Id. at 8-9.
27. The more common label for the doctrine is "comparative negligence." However, in
order to avoid confusion of the doctrine with contributory negligence and in recognition of
the increasing application of the doctrine to actions other than negligence, I will use the
label "comparative fault."
28. Prosser, ComparativeNegligence, 51 Mich. L Rev. 465, 465 n.2 (1953).
29. V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence 31 (1974).
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This is done by the fact finder who compares the respective faults of
the plaintiff and defendant and divides the damages accordingly.
The contributory negligence defense, which flourished in the nineteenth century, must now be recognized as the minority rule, adhered to in an increasingly diminishing number of jurisdictions. Com3
parative fault has replaced contributory negligence in England, 0
parts of Canada, 3 1 Ireland,3 2 New Zealand, 3 3 and parts of Australia. 3 4 In the United States, comparative fault is the majority rule
by any standard. Thirty-three states3 I have abandoned the contributory negligence defense and have substituted for it some form of
comparative fault. At least three-quarters of the population of the
United States is governed by some form of general comparative fault
37
system. 3 6 The federal courts apply comparative fault in admiralty
and Federal Employer's Liability Act 3 cases.
30. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28.
31. See Maloney, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law Reform, 11 U. Fla. L. Rev. 135, 154 n.109 (1958).
32. The contributory negligence defense was abolished in Ireland and comparative fault
substituted by the Civil Liability Act of 1961. See Contributory Negligence and the Civil
Liability Act, 77 Ir. Jur. 26 (1961).
33. Stat. N. Z. 3, at 29 (1947).
34. See, e.g., Repr. Acts W. Austl. 23 (1947).
35. Alaska: Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Arkansas: Ark. Stat. Ann.
§ §27-1763 to -1765 (Repl. 1979); California: Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532
P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. §13-21-111 (1973 &
Supp. 1978); Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §52-572(h) (West Supp. 1979);Florida:
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d431 (Fla. 1973);Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § §94-703, 105-603
(1978); Hawaii: Haw. Rev. Stat. §663-31 (1976); Idaho: Idaho Code § §6-801, 802, 804
(1979); Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. §60-258(a) (1976); Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14,
§156 (Supp. 1978-1979); Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231, §85 (West Supp.
1979); Michigan: Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979);
Minnesota: Minn. Stat. Ann. §604.01 (West Supp. 1979); Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann.
§11-7-15 (1972); Montana: Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. §58.607.1 (Supp. 1975); Nebraska:
Neb. Rev. Stat. §25-1151 (1975); Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. §41.141 (1977); New Hampshire: N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §507:7-a (Supp. 1977); New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A:155.1 to -5.3 (West. Supp. 1979-1980); New York: N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law §§1411-1413
(McKinney 1976); North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 9-10-07 (1975); Oklahoma: Okla. Stat.
Ann. tit. 23 §§13, 14 (West. Supp. 1979-1980); Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. § § 18.470, 18.475,
18.480, 18.485, 18.490 (1977); Pennsylvania: 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7102 (Purdon 1979
Pamphlet); Rhode Island: R-I. Gen. Laws §9-20-4, 4.1 (Supp. 1978); South Dakota: S.D.
Compiled Laws Ann. § 20-9-2 (1967); Texas: Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 221 2(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1978-1979); Utah: Utah Code Ann. § §78-27-37, 38, 41 (1977); Vermont: Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 12, §1036 (1973); Washington: Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §4.22.010 (Supp. 1978);
Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. Ann. §895.045 (West Supp. 1978-1979); Wyoming: Wyo. Stat.
§ 1-1-109 (1977).
36. Included in the states adopting comparative fault are some of our most populous
states. California (19,953,134); New York (18,241,266); Pennsylvania (11,793,909); Texas
(11,196,730); and Michigan (8,875,083) themselves account for more than one-third of the
nation's population. 1970 United States Census, in The World Almanac & Book of Facts
1979 (1978).
37. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
38. 45 U.S.C. § 53 (1976).
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Indeed, the substitution of comparative fault principles for the
contributory negligence defense has accelerated in recent years. Of

the thirty-three states adopting comparative fault, twenty-seven have
done so since 1965, 3 9 and seventeen since 1972.40
New Mexico's continued fidelity to the contributory negligence

bar to recovery isolates the state from all but one 4 of its neighbor-

ing states. Utah, 4 2 Colorado, 4 Oklahoma, 4" and Texas4 ' all have
adopted comparative fault principles. New Mexico's adherence to the
contributory negligence defense has not been for want of the opportunity to abandon the rule. Since 1957, the New Mexico legislature
has considered bills to enact comparative fault no less than six
times. 4 6 The latest attempt was in 1977, when a House Bill providing for a comparative fault system passed the House of Represen-

tatives, received a "do pass" recommendation in the Senate Judiciary

4
Committee, and was then killed in the Senate Finance Committee. 7
In 1974, the New Mexico Supreme Court was presented with the

opportunity to abandon the contributory negligence bar to recovery
and adopt comparative fault principles. In Syroid v. Albuquerque
Gravel Products Co., 4 8 the plaintiff was injured in an automobile
accident. The plaintiff alleged that the accident was caused by the
defendant's negligence in design of the roadway. The defendant pled
the plaintiff's contributory negligence as a defense. The plaintiff
moved to strike the defense on the basis that the contributory negligence defense should be abandoned and that the plaintiff's contributory misconduct should be considered only for purposes of miti-

gating damages. The trial court denied the motion to strike the
39. Alaska (1975), California (1975), Colorado (1971), Connecticut (1973), Florida
(1973), Hawaii (1969), Idaho (1971), Kansas (1974), Maine (1965), Massachusetts (1969),
Michigan (1979), Minnesota (1969), Montana (1975), Nevada (1973), New Hampshire
(1969), New Jersey (1973), New York (1975), North Dakota (1973), Oklahoma (1973),
Oregon (1971), Pennsylvania (1976), Rhode Island (1971), Texas (1973), Utah (1973),
Vermont (1969), Washington (1973), Wyoming (1973). See note 35 supra for statutory
citations.
40. Alaska, California, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New
Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wyoming.
41. Arizona, alone of New Mexico's neighbors, retains the contributory negligence defense. Ariz. Const. art. 18, §5.
42. Utah Code Ann. § §78-27-37, 38, 41 (1977).
43. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-111 (1973 & Supp. 1978).
44. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 23 § § 13, 14 (West Supp. 1979-1980).
45. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2212(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978-1979).
46. See H.B. 75, 33d Leg., 1st Sess. (1977); H.B. 187, 30th Leg., 1st Sess. (1971); S.B.
178, 29th Leg., 1st Sess. (1969); H.B. 266, 26th Leg., 1st Sess. (1963); S.B. 166, 25th Leg.,
1st Sess. (1961); S.B. 108, 23d Leg., 1st Sess. (1957).
47. See Journal of the Senate of New Mexico, 33d Leg., 1st Sess. 739.
48. 86 N.M. 235, 522 P.2d 570 (1974).
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defense but certified the question for interlocutory review.4 The
question was certified to the supreme court' 0 which granted review.
A sharply divided court'
held that the contributory negligence
defense would be retained.
After careful consideration and weighing of the possible benefits
to the administration of justice which might reasonably be expected
from the adoption of comparative negligence as against the probable
harm which might reasonably result from the abandonment of contributory negligence, we feel the better course to pursue is to retain
our existing doctrine of contributory negligence.5 2

The Syroid decision stands as the last time the highest appellate
court of any state has refused to adopt comparative fault principles
judicially.5 " Since Syroid, the supreme courts of California, 4
Alaska," s and Michigan5 6 have adopted comparative fault. In addition, the supreme courts of Texas5 7 and New Hampshire" have
adopted comparative fault principles to reach situations not already
covered by their states' comparative fault statutes.
These developments strongly suggest that the eventual adoption of
comparative fault principles in New Mexico is inevitable and that the
time for such a change is at hand. Whatever were the merits of the
Syroid decision when it was decided, subsequent events have undermined its authority.5 9 After a brief description of the different types
of comparative fault systems, the remainder of this article will explore the issues involved in judicial adoption of comparative fault
principles: (1) whether the court is an appropriate agency to effect
the change from contributory negligence to comparative fault, and
(2) whether the contributory negligence doctrine should be repudiated.
49. N.M. Stat. Ann. §39-3-4 (1978).
50. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 34-5-14 (1978).
51. The majority opinion by Justice Oman was concurred in by Justices Montoya and
Martinez. Chief Justice McManus and Justice Stephenson dissented. None of the five justices
who participated in the Syroid decision remains on the court.
52. 86 N.M. at 237, 522 P.2d at 572.
53. Since Syroid, one intermediate appellate court has refused to adopt comparative
fault principles. See Chandler v. Mattox, 544 S.W.2d 85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
54. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
55. See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975).
56. See Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979).
57. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
58. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 119 N.H.
., 395 A.2d 843 (1978).
59. Recently, the New Mexico Supreme Court, in dicta, indicated its continued adherence to the contributory negligence defense. See Commercial Union Assurance Cos. v.
Western Farm Bureau Ins. Cos., 18 N.M. St. B. Bull. 830, 831 (Nov. 15, 1979). This case is
discussed in the text at notes 196-210 infra.
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TYPES OF COMPARATIVE FAULT SYSTEMS
The term "comparative fault" encompasses a variety of systems
that apportion the costs of an accident according to the relative
faults of the parties. The systems extant in the United States differ in
two areas. First, there are two different ways a state may treat the
plaintiff when his fault is greater than that of the defendant. Some
states 6 0 have adopted a "pure" form of comparative fault whereby a
plaintiff may recover from a defendant even if the plaintiff's fault
was greater than that of the defendant. On the other hand, some
states 6 1 have adopted a "modified" form of comparative fault
whereby the plaintiff will be barred completely from recovery if his
fault is found to be of a certain degree, as compared to that of the
defendant.
Second, the extent of application of the comparative fault system
differs. Some states 6 2 have given their comparative fault principles
expansive application, extending the concept to such areas as strict
tort liability 6 I and nuisance 64 and using the new comparative fault
regime as an opportunity to abandon prior common law distinctions. 6 1 Other states, 6 6 however, have chosen to confine the application of their newly adopted comparative fault principles to actions
that traditionally sounded in negligence.
"Pure" vs. "Modified" ComparativeFault
While, of course, there is only one kind of pure comparative fault
system, there are three different modified comparative fault systems.
There is the "slight/gross" system in which the plaintiff remains
barred from recovery unless his contributory fault is "slight" as compared to the defendant's "gross" fault.6 1 Where the plaintiff's fault
is slight and the defendant's gross, the plaintiff is allowed to recover,
but his damages are diminished in an amount attributable to his
fault.
60. See, e.g., New York Civ. Prac. Law § 1411 (McKinney 1976); see generally V.
Schwartz, Comparative Negligence 46-47 (1974).
61. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. Ann. §895.045 (West Supp. 1978-1979); see generally V.
Schwartz, Comparative Negligence 32-33 (1974).
62. See, e.g, New York Civ. Prac. Law § 1411 (McKinney 1976); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14,
§ 156 (Supp. 1978-1979).
63. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1978).
64. See Schiro v. Omental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 76 N.W.2d 355 (1956).
65. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 825, 532 P.2d 1226, 1241, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858, 873 (1975).
66. See, e.g., Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353, 1367 (Okla. 1974).
67. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1151 (Supp. 1978); S.D. Comp. Laws Ann. §20-9-2 (1967).
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The second type of modified system bars the plaintiff from recovery where his fault is equal to, or greater than, the defendant's.6 8
Thus, if a fact finder were to determine that the plaintiff and the
defendant were equally at fault, the plaintiff would be barred from
recovery. The third type of modified system allows a plaintiff to
recover damages unless his fault was greater than that of the defendant. 6 9 Thus, if the fact finder were to find the plaintiff and the
defendant equally culpable, the plaintiff would be allowed to recover, but his damages would be reduced in an amount attributable
to his own fault.
The "slight/gross" system has been adopted in only two states. 70
Both states adopted comparative fault quite early"' in the experiment; the particular formulation they chose may be viewed as reflecting a hesitancy in their commitment to the new order. The
modified approach to comparative fault is dominated by the latter
two types of systems which differ only with respect to whether the
plaintiff should be allowed any recovery where the plaintiff and
defendant are equally at fault in the accident. Since a finding that
the plaintiff and defendant are equally at fault in an accident is quite
common,' 2 this difference is of considerable importance.
Of these latter two variants, the system which barred the plaintiff
from recovery where he and the defendant were equally at fault
originally was the more popular. 73 Recently, however, the trend
appears to be moving in favor of allowing the plaintiff to recover
where his fault is equal to the defendant's. The most recent legislative adoptions of comparative fault have enacted this system, 7 4 and
some states that originally followed the former system have amended
their statutes to allow the plaintiff to recover where both parties
were equally at fault.s7 A likely reason for this trend is that allowing
the plaintiff recovery is perceived to be more consonant with the
underlying premises of comparative fault. 7 6 Additionally, in those
states in which the jury is prohibited from being informed of the
68. See, e.g, Colo. Rev. Stat. §13-21-111 (1973 & Supp. 1978); Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-37 (1977).
69. See, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §507:7-a (Supp. 1971); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §1036
(1973).
70. The two states adopting the "slight/gross" system are Nebraska and South Dakota.
See note 67 supra.
71. See 1913 Neb. Laws, ch. 124; 1941 S.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 160.
72. See Fleming, Forword to Comparative Negligence At Last-By Judicial Choice, 64
Calif. L. Rev. 239, 245 (1976).
73. See V. Schwartz, Comparative Fault 76 (1974).
74. See, e.g, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7102 (Purdon 1979 Pamphlet).
75. See, e.g., 1971 Wis. Laws, ch. 47.
76. See text at notes 101-02 infra.
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legal effect of its deliberation, 7 the former system is perceived to be
particularly prejudicial to plaintiffs. 7 8
As between pure and modified comparative fault systems, the
courts and the commentators clearly prefer the pure system of comparative fault. Every court that has adopted comparative fault judicially has elected to have the pure form.7 In selecting the pure form
of comparative fault, the California Supreme Court noted:
We have concluded that the "pure" form of comparative negligence is that which should be adopted in this state. In our view the
[modified] system simply shifts the lottery aspect of the contributory negligence rule to a different ground .... In effect "such a rule
distorts the very principle it recognizes, i.e., that persons are responsible for their acts to the extent their fault contributes to an injurious result. The [modified system] simply lowers, but does not
eliminate, the bar of contributory negligence . . . ."'o
In electing to have a pure form of comparative fault, the Michigan
Supreme Court considered that a modified form created an unjust
enrichment of the defendant by allowing him to avoid having to pay
for injuries he had caused." 1 The Alaska Supreme Court noted that
the pure comparative fault system "is the simplest to administer and
[the onel which is best calculated to bring about substantial justice
in negligence cases." 8 2 Most commentators also have found the pure
form of comparative fault to be more compatible with the underlying premises of comparative fault.' I
Application of Comparative Fault Beyond Negligence Actions
Among the existing comparative fault systems, there are substantial differences in the application of the systems beyond negligence
actions. Each state judicially adopting comparative fault has given
77. See, e.g, Avery v. Wadlington, 186 Colo. 158, 526 P.2d 295 (1974).
78. See Fleming, supra note 72, at 245.
79. See Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); Kaatz
v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d
1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
80. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 827-28, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242-43, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858, 874-75 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
81. Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, -,
275 N.W.2d 511, 519
(1979) (quoting Kirby v. Lawson, 400 Mich. 585, 643, 256 N.W.2d 400, 427-28 (1977).
82. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1044 (Alaska 1975).
83. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 72, at 246-47; Schwartz, Judicial Adoption of Comparative Negligence-The Supreme Court of California Takes a HistoricalStand, 51 Ind. L.J.
281, 288 (1976).
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the principles expansive application beyond traditional negligence
actions.8 4
Where the comparative fault system has been adopted by legislative action, the application of comparative fault beyond negligence
actions depends on statutory construction and the perception by the
courts of the policies underlying the comparative fault principles.
Some comparative fault statutes are written in broad terms, evidencing a legislative intent for expansive application. Thus, New
York's statute, by its terms, applies "in any action to recover dam8
ages for personal injury, injury to property, or wrongful death." s
The legislative reports accompanying the act clearly establish a legislative intent to give the act the widest possible application. "[TIhis
[statute] is applicable not only to negligence actions, but to all
actions brought to recover damages for personal injury, injury to
property or wrongful death whatever the legal theory upon which
8
the suit is based." 6
Even when the statute is written in terms of "negligence," ' 8 7 some
courts have found the policies underlying comparative fault to warrant a wider application and have construed the statutes to have
application beyond negligence. 8 Thus, in construing the Kansas
comparative fault statute8 9 to apply to strict tort liability actions, a
federal district court reasoned:
We must remember that the "business" or "society" which bears the
cost of a plaintiffs strict liability recovery refers in reality to other
users of the manufacturer's product since the cost is inevitably
passed on. Why is it desirable to transfer to these third parties the
cost of that part of a plaintiff's injury which is attributable to his
own culpable conduct?...
...The same equitable considerations which underlie comparative
liability and militate against barring a culpable plaintiff must also
work in favor of a defendant who does not bear all the blame for the
injury."
84. See Butaud v. Suburban Marine Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976);
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978);
West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ §600.2945-.2949 (Supp. 1979-1980).
85. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1411 (McKinney 1976).
86. McKinney's 1975 Session Laws of New York at 1484.
87. See, e.g., Hawaii Rev. Stat. §663-31 (1976).
88. See, e.g., Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443,
-,
155 N.W.2d 55, 64 (1967); Sun
Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 603 (D. Idaho 1976);
Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 754 (D. Kan. 1978).
89. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-258(a) (1976), which provides, in pertinent part that "contributory negligence... shall not bar [a] party... from recovering damages for negligence...."
90. Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740, 754 (D. Kan. 1978).
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Some courts have construed their comparative fault statutes
narrowly, confining the application of the statute to traditional negligence actions. 9 1 Even in these instances, however, the impetus
toward wider application of comparative fault principles could not
9 2 and
be restrained. Thus the supreme courts of New Hampshire
9
Texas " construed their comparative fault statutes to apply only to
negligence actions and refused to apply the statutes to strict tort
liability actions. Both courts went on, however, to adopt judicially
comparative fault concepts to govern strict tort liability actions.
Occasionally, a court's narrow construction of its state's strict tort
liability statute provokes a response by the legislature. Thus, in 1976
the Connecticut Supreme Court construed the Connecticut statute
not to apply to strict tort liability actions. 9 4 The next year, the
Connecticut legislature enacted a statute that extended comparative
fault principles to such actions. 9 5
While differences remain among the jurisdictions concerning the
application of comparative fault principles, a definite trend may be
discerned. The legislatures are expanding the application of compara9
tive fault either through expansive wording of original enactments 6
or through later amendments 9 7 explicitly designed to extend the
scope of the preexisting statute. The courts are taking a similarly
expansive approach. Where comparative fault principles are adopted
9
through judicial decision, expansive application appears inevitable. I
In construing comparative fault statutes, the courts typically construe the statutes broadly. 9 9 Even when the courts feel constrained
by the statutory language, they have moved on their own to extend
the reach of comparative fault.1

0

Common CharacteristicsAmong Comparative FaultSystems
While there is a wide variety of comparative fault systems, they all
share three common characteristics. First, comparative fault is designed to facilitate recovery by plaintiffs. Just as the contributory
negligence defense reflected the nineteenth century protectionist
91. See, e.g., Kinard v. Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976); Brown v.
Link Belt Corp., 565 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1977).
395 A.2d 843 (1978).
92. Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 119 N.H. __,
93. General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
94. Hoelter v. Mohawk Servs., Inc., 170 Conn. 495, 365 A.2d 1064 (1976).
95. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-572(1) (West Supp. 1979).
96. See, e.g;, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1411 (McKinney 1976).

97. See 1975 Or. Laws, ch. 599.
98. See text at notes 84 supra.

99. See text at notes 87-90 supra.

100. See text at notes 9 2-93 supra.
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attitude toward industrial defendants,1 01 comparative fault reflects
the distinctly twentieth century preference for compensation.' 0 2
Second, comparative fault systems emphasize fault as a basis for
defining the scope of liability. One of the criticisms of the contributory negligence defense is the recognition that barring the plaintiff
from recovery often relieves the defendant from responsibility for
injuries occasioned by the defendant's fault. As such, contributory
negligence is inconsistent with fault-based liability.' 03 Comparative
fault is intended to reaffirm and emphasize fault as the basis of
liability. In this respect, comparative fault may be at cross-currents
with the twentieth century trend toward liability based on no-fault
concepts.'

04

Finally, comparative fault reflects a shift in the balance of responsibilities between the judge and the jury in accident litigation. The
contributory negligence defense arose out of an antagonism toward
the jury and was used as a tool by judges to exercise control over
jury discretion.'
Comparative fault necessarily reposes more
responsibility in the jury. Under comparative fault systems, more
cases go to the jury and the scope of jury discretion is widened.
JUDICIAL ADOPTION OF COMPARATIVE FAULT PRINCIPLES
Comparative fault has been around for a long time. The doctrine
has been applied in actions under certain federal statutes' 0 6 and in
at least three states' 0 7 since the beginning of the twentieth century.
It was not until the 1960's, however, that comparative fault principles "turned the corner" and were widely adopted.' 0S These early
experiments were all effected through legislative enactment.' 0 9
The legislative approach to adoption of comparative fault principles has been criticized as "arduous, unpredictable, and full of
101. See text at notes 9-11 supra.
102. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A, Comment c (1965).
103. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 811, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 862 (1975).
104. See Kinard v. Coats Co., Inc., 37 Colo. App. 555,
-, 553 P.2d 835, 837 (1976).
105. See text at notes 12-14 sutpra.
106. Comparative fault has been applied pursuant to the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. §688
(1976) and the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §53 (1976), since 1920 and
1908, respectively.
107. Georgia's adoption of comparative fault dates back to the nineteenth century. See
Ga. Code § §2914, 2979 (1863). Mississippi first adopted comparative fault in 1910. See
1910 Miss. Laws, ch. 135. Nebraska adopted comparative fault in 1913. See 1913 Neb.
Laws, ch. 124.
108. See V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence 11-16 (1974).
109. Id.
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snares and chicanery."' 10 Until the late 1960's, however, judicial
adoption of comparative fault was nothing more than an academic's
pipedream.' ' In 1967, the intermediate appellate court' 1 2 in Illinois, at the invitation of the supreme court,' ' 3 considered whether
comparative fault principles should be adopted judicially. The court
accepted the supreme court's invitation and held that it would substitute comparative fault principles for the preexisting contributory
negligence defense.' 1 4 On appeal again to the supreme court, the
court had second thoughts and reversed, holding that change to comparative fault must await legislative action.' 1 5
While the judicial adoption of comparative fault in Illinois was
stillborn, it did serve to focus considerable attention on the issue by
the leading tort scholars and commentators of the day.' 1 6 Such
attention portended further attempts at judicial adoption which were
not long in coming. In 1973, the Supreme Court of Florida responded favorably to the notion and adopted comparative fault principles. In Hoffman v. Jones,' 1 7 the court considered the change
from the contributory negligence defense to comparative fault principles to be within the province of the court:
We are, therefore, of the opinion that we do have the power and
authority to reexamine the position we have taken in regard to
contributory negligence and to alter the rule we have adopted previously in light of current "social and1economic customs" and modern "conceptions of right and justice." 1 8
The Florida Supreme Court's judicial adoption of comparative
fault clearly broke the logjam and encouraged litigants to raise the
issue in other courts. In 1975, the California Supreme Court held
that the substitution of comparative fault principles for the contributory negligence defense was a matter that could be accomplished
the court
through judicial decision. In Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,'1
adopted a pure form of comparative fault. The commentators wel110. Fleming, supra note 72, at 241.

111. See, e.g., Peck, The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law,

48 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 304-07 (1963); Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75
Harv. L. Rev. 463, 508-09 (1962).
112. Maki v. Frelk, 85 111.App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (1967).
229 N.E.2d at 285.
113. Id. at-.,
229 N.E.2d at 291.
114. Id. at -,
115. Maki v. Frelk, 40 Il. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968).

116. See, e.g., Symposium, Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory
Negligence: Should the Court or LegislatureDecide? 21 Vand. L. Rev. 889 (1968).
117. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
118. Id at 436.
119. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
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comed the Li decision not only for the cogency of its opinion but
also for the prestige of the court. 2 0
After the California Supreme Court's decision in Li, two more
jurisdictions adopted comparative fault by judicial decision. In Kaatz
v. State,1 2 ' decided shortly after Li, the Supreme Court of Alaska
adopted comparative fault principles. In Kirby v. Larson,' 22 three
justices' 23 of the Michigan Supreme Court, writing the opinion of
the court, purported to adopt comparative fault principles. The opinion relied heavily on the decisions of the Florida, Alaska, and California courts.' 24 Two years later, the Michigan Supreme Court reaffirmed the Kirby decision and held that the contributory negligence bar to recovery would be replaced with comparative fault
principles. 12-5
Four cases do not make a trend, and the six years since the Florida
Supreme Court's decision in Hoffman v. Jones' 26 hardly provide an
opportunity for extensive consideration of, and reflection on, the
issues raised by judicial adoption of comparative fault. This does not
mean, however, that no conclusions may be drawn from the experience since the Hoffman decision. It is certainly fair to say that the
decisions have lent a legitimacy to the claim that judicial adoption of
comparative fault is appropriate. Moreover, there can be no doubt
that the various factors involved in judicial adoption now receive
more careful consideration than they received ten years ago. Finally,
it can safely be predicted that more litigants will raise the issue in
coming years.
The cases establish the framework for analyzing the claim that the
judiciary ought to substitute comparative fault principles for the
preexisting contributory negligence bar to recovery. Two issues arise
when the claim is presented: (1) Is the court an appropriate agency
to effect the substitution? and (2) Should the contributory negligence bar to recovery be repudiated? When the New Mexico Supreme
Court considered the question of judicial adoption of comparative
fault in Syroid v. Albuquerque Gravel Products Co.,"2"1 the court

employed that analysis.
In rejecting the invitation to adopt comparative fault principles, the
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 72, at 274.
540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975).
400 Mich. 585, 256 N.W.2d 400 (1977).
The court was evenly split on the issue, with one justice not participating.
400 Mich. at -, 256 N.W.2d at 421-25.
Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979).
280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
86 N.M. 235, 522 P.2d 570 (1974).
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court rested its decision on the second issue. The court felt it unnecessary to consider whether a court is the proper agency to substitute
comparative fault for contributory negligence 1"2 and, instead, refused to repudiate the contributory negligence defense.
The court advanced six reasons why the contributory negligence
defense should not be rejected. First, the court noted that only one
court had rejected the contributory negligence doctrine and that at
least five courts had retained contributory negligence in response to
the challenge. 29 Second, the court pointed out that only twentyone states had adopted comparative fault principles, of which only
four had adopted comparative fault in its pure form." 0 Third, the
court was unconvinced that the contributory negligence defense was
as "harsh as has been imagined and urged by its critics." 1 3 1 The
court pointed to several existing common law developments that
served to mitigate the harshness of the contributory negligence
defense.' 32 Fourth, the court concluded that the contributory negligence defense was a more workable system than a comparative fault
system. 1 33 The court emphasized that it considered it to be impossible for a jury to determine "precise percentage of culpable negligence of each of the tortfeasors."' ' Fifth, the court chastised the
proponents of the comparative fault principle for addressing only the
defects in the contributory negligence defense and for failing to demonstrate affirmatively the superiority of comparative fault.' I
Finally, the court appeared to infer from the failure of the legislature
to pass any of the comparative fault legislative proposals
a policy
1
judgment by the legislature against comparative fault. 3 6
Is the Courta ProperAgency to Effect the Change?
The question of the propriety of judicial adoption of comparative
fault is one that has excited considerable attention among academics.' 1 3 When the courts are convinced that the contributory
negligence defense is discredited, however,1 they have expressed little
reluctance to take on the task themselves. 3 8
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id at 235-36, 522 P.2d at 570-71.
Id at 236, 522 P.2d at 571.
Id at 237, 522 P.2d at 572.

Id
Id. at 237-38, 522 P.2d at 572-73.
Id. at 238, 522 P.2d at 573.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence 351-65 (1974); Fleming, supra note

72, at 273-82.
138. See cases cited at note 79 supra.
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The arguments that support the power of the court to effect a
change from contributory negligence to comparative fault appear
overwhelming. The obvious point of departure in any analysis lies in
the recognition that the courts, as well as the legislature, retain the
power to alter the common law.' '9 It is universally recognized that
the contributory negligence doctrine arose in and was nourished by
common law courts.'40 For the courts to claim that the burden of
correcting the defects and inequities created by a doctrine of the
court's own making seems unreasonable. As the Florida Supreme
Court stated in Hoffman i'. Jones 4 1 in adopting comparative fault:
"Legislative action could, of course, be taken, but we abdicate our
own function, in a field peculiarly nonstatutory, when we refuse to
reconsider an old and unsatisfactory court-made rule."' 42
The New Mexico courts consistently have recognized the power of
common law courts to alter common law rules when those rules are
in need of change. Indeed, in the area of tort law, the New Mexico
courts have taken a particularly activist role. Over the past ten years,
the New Mexico courts have abolished such traditional tort defenses
as sovereign immunity' 4
and interspousal tort immunity." 4' The
supreme court also has invalidated the "Guest Statute"' I I and abolished the defense of assumption of the risk in negligence actions and
merged that defense into the contributory negligence defense.' 46
The court's activism has not been confined to the elimination or
modification of defenses. In Stang v. Hertz Corp.,' 7 the supreme
court adopted strict tort liability as a theory governing a manufacturer's or seller's liability for injuries sustained through defective
products.
In abolishing the defense of sovereign immunity, the New Mexico
Supreme Court traversed the issue of the power of the court to alter
long-standing common law rules. 1 4 8 The court noted that the defense of sovereign immunity was a creation of the judiciary "and,
therefore, can also be put to rest by the judiciary."''
The court
then addressed the contention that the statute' ' 0 declaring the com139.
(1979);
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 644, 275 N.W.2d 511, 517
United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 (1975).
See Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1047 (Alaska 1975).
280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
Id. at 436 (citation omitted) (emphasis removed).
Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975).
Maestas v. Overton, 87 N.M. 213, 531 P.2d 947 (1975).
McGeehan v. Bunch, 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238 (1975).
Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336,491 P.2d 1147 (1971).
83 N.M. 730,497 P.2d 732 (1972).
Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 544 P.2d 1153 (1975).
Id. at 590, 544 P.2d at 1155.
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-1-3 (1978).
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mon law to be the rule of practice in New Mexico withdrew from the
courts the ability to alter preexisting common law rules.
Defendant contends the common law rule must be applied because by statute the common law rule is the rule of practice and
decision in New Mexico. [Citations omitted.] The answer is that the
common law is not the rule of practiceand decision if "inapplicable
to conditions in New Mexico. ". . . If the common law is not "applicable to our conditions and circumstances" it is not to be given

effect. 15 1

Over the past decade the New Mexico courts have demonstrated
clearly that they see themselves as playing a primary role in the
shaping of common law rules governing tort actions. It seems unlikely that the court will retreat from that role now and abdicate its
power in this area to the legislature.
Recognizing that the courts have the power to adopt comparative
fault does not end the inquiry, however. It remains to be determined
whether the court is a better agency than the legislature to effect the
change to comparative fault. Resolution of this question involves
inquiries into three areas: (1) whether the court or the legislature is
better able to understand the problem, (2) whether the court or the
legislature is better able to fashion and implement a solution, and (3)
whether the court or the legislature is more capable of ensuring
fairness to all interested parties.
One noted commentator has suggested that the problems involved
in the decision whether to substitute comparative fault for the contributory negligence defense are uniquely within the court's understanding. In commenting on the California Supreme Court's adoption
of comparative fault in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,1 - 2 Professor John
Fleming stated: "[01 n the question of contributory negligence, one
cannot very well dispute the unique judicial experience and preoccupation, after daily confrontation with it over more than a century and a record of continuing refiguration ....In a nutshell, this is

preeminently lawyer's law."' I I
Additionally, the courts are uniquely capable of understanding the
virtues of comparative fault. As discussed elsewhere,' I ' the primary
virtues of comparative fault may be found in its consonancy with the
underlying fault premise of negligence. It is the courts that are
151. 88 N.M. at 590, 544 P.2d at 1155 (quoting from Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601,
603, 506 P.2d 345, 347 (Ct. App. 1973).
152. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
153. Fleming, supra note 72, at 279-80.
154. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
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charged with the primary administration of negligence law. In that
capacity, they must inquire constantly into the fault premises of
negligence and the application of those premises to varying circumstances. Certainly, as between the courts and the legislature, it is the
courts that have the greater claim to expertise. Finally, any problem
created by the implementation of a newly adopted comparative fault
system will most likely arise in judicial administration of the new
system (e.g., application to torts other than negligence, modifications
of related doctrines, accommodating the shift of responsibility between judge and jury). Again, with respect to these problems, the
courts clearly appear the more appropriate forum for consideration.
One of the most persistent arguments in favor of deferring to
legislative action in the adoption of comparative fault principles is
that the implementation of an entirely new regime, such as comparative fault, is a particularly legislative activity. 1 5 1 Proponents of this
argument identify the adoption of a comparative fault system as a
reform requiring extensive consideration of a wide variety of problems. They conclude that such consideration is fundamentally inconsistent with the primary judicial function of deciding the particular
controversy before the court. They argue that courts should never
undertake a task that cannot be fully accomplished in the case before
the court. Under this argument, the legislature is the only body that
can accomplish such an extensive implementation through a comprehensive statute. 1 6
Experience has not borne out the validity of this argument. Careful reflection on the judicial process reveals that inherent in judicial
decision-making is the potential that a particular decision will have
widespread ramifications and will open up new questions to be
answered.' - 7 Courts are not wholly incapable of dealing with the
ramifications of, and loose ends created by, their own decisions. As
one commentator noted:
[C] ourts can ... anticipate several of the most important of these
questions and thus dispose with the need for having them later explored at the cost of future litigants. Far from deserving rebuke for
dealing with hypotheticals, this practice reveals courts as being on
occasion at least as well equipped as legislatures in laying down a
reasonably comprehensive blueprint of reform.' 5 8
155. See V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 21.6, at 354-55 (1974).
156. See Fleming, supra note 72, at 280.
157. The United States Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954), is a good example of such a case. In Brown, the Supreme Court expressly
reserved for later consideration the "problems of considerable complexity" involved in
applying its decision that racial segregation in public school education was unconstititional.
347 U.S. at 495.
158. Fleming, supra note 72, at 281.
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Moreover, it is not all that clear that all ramifications of the adoption of comparative fault need be addressed in advance and that all
loose ends need be tied up. It is well recognized that the adoption of
comparative fault will require numerous refinements and adjustments
in collateral doctrines.' 9 At least some of these questions may best
be resolved in the context of specific controversies which will highlight any conflicting interests and policies. Dealing with these problems on an ad hoc basis over an extended period of time will allow
the courts to gain experience in the problems inherent in the administration of the new system and the policies underlying it.
Finally, the optimism that legislative adoption of comparative
fault will be accomplished through sweeping and comprehensive
statutory schemes appears unjustified. "[A]lmost all comparative
negligence statutes are also in the briefest conceivable form and leave
the very same ancillary questions likewise to the courts for future
solution." 1 60 Even where the legislature has attempted to address
specific problems of application,' 6" this has not obviated the need
for judicial intervention. 62
The third factor to be considered in determining the relative superiority of the court or the legislature as the agency to adopt comparative fault principles is the consideration of which body is more
capable of ensuring fairness to the parties affected by the adoption
and implementation of comparative fault. Two elements of fairness
are involved here: (1) whether the system adopted is a fair one, and
(2) whether the population is given a fair opportunity to adjust to
the new system.
Most observers identify the pure form of comparative fault as
fairer than the modified systems.1 63 Every court which has adopted
comparative fault judicially has chosen the pure form. On the other
hand, the modified form is more popular with the legislatures.1 64 It
159. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 823-29, 532 P.2d 1226, 1239-44,
119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 871-76 (1976).
160. Fleming, supra note 72, at 281. A good example is the New York comparative fault
statute, N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law § 1411 (McKinney 1976), which provides, in full:
In any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property,
or wrongful death, the culpable conduct attributable to the claimant or to
the decedent, including contributory negligence or assumption of risk, shall
not bar recovery, but the amount of damages otherwise recoverable shall be
diminished in the proportion which the culpable conduct attributable to the
claimant or decedent bears to the culpable conduct which caused the damages.
161. See 1973 Mass. Acts ch. 1123.
162. See Graci v. Damon, 78 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 273, 374 N.E.2d 311, aff'd, 78
Mass. Adv. Sh. 3129, 383 N.E.2d 842 (1978).
163. See, e.g., Fleming, supra note 72, at 246-47.
164. Id. at 244.
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is at least a reasonable inference that the courts, free of lobbyists and
pressure groups, are institutionally more capable of selecting the
fairer comparative fault system.
It is sometimes contended that the legislature, with its ability to
postpone the application of the newly adopted comparative fault
system through a purely prospective statute, is inherently more capable than the courts in providing interested parties with a fair opportunity to adjust to the new system.1 6 ' This argument hardly seems
persuasive. First, it is doubtful whether there is any extensive reliance on the contributory negligence defense requiring time for
accommodation. 1 66 The most likely arena in which accommodation
will be necessary is in the courts, where lawyers, judges, and juries
will have to adjust to the new system. The courts are at least equally
as capable as the legislature in identifying the necessary accommodations to be made in the litigation process and in implementing them.
Even where time may be needed in order for parties to accommodate the newly adopted comparative fault system, the courts are not
without the ability to provide such time. All the courts which have
judicially adopted comparative fault have employed a limited retroactive application. 1 6 7 In the rare situation where the courts have
determined that purely prospective application of the new rule is
warranted, 1the courts have accorded their decisions purely prospective effect. 6 8
In conclusion, there appears to be little controversy over the issue
of whether the courts are appropriate agencies to effect the change
from the contributory negligence defense to comparative fault. The
real issue is whether the court or the legislature is the better agency
165. Id at 281.
-,
530 P.2d 630, 632 (1975), the court
166. In Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959,
addressed the point in a different context.
-Turning to the instant case, it must be noted that respondent does not
argue that it, or any other defendant, would have relied on the common law
bar to recovery provided by contributory negligence when committing the
alleged tort of negligence. It almost goes without saying that the existence or
lack of such an affirmative defense has no effect on the every day conduct of
individuals. Defendants do not act less negligently or more so because of the
presence or absence of an affirmative defense of contributory negligence.
One cannot have a vested right in a tort defense the merits of which cannot
be determined until trial and upon which he does not and cannot rely in the
initial injury to a plaintiff.
275 N.W.2d 511,
-,
167. See Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638,
520-22 (1979); Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1050 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,
18 Cal. 3d 804, 830, 532 P.2d 1226, 1244, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 876 (1975); Hoffman v.
Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 439-40 (Fla. 1973).
168. Cf Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 593-94, 544 P.2d 1153, 1158-59 (1976) (prospective effect given to overruling governmental immunity from tort liability).
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to effect the change. It seems clear that the court is particularly well
suited for that purpose.
Should the Contributory Negligence Defense Be Repudiated?
The second issue that must be addressed by a court considering
judicial adoption of comparative fault principles is whether the contributory negligence defense should be repudiated. Resolution of this
issue involves a balancing of the respective defects and virtues of the
contributory negligence defense and the comparative fault doctrine.
The court must also consider whether the doctrine of stare decisis
should dissuade the court from repudiating the contributory negligence defense. Finally, the court must consider the effect of the
refusal of the legislature to enact comparative fault legislation.
The criticisms of the contributory negligence defense have already
been described.' 69 The primary benefits of the contributory negligence defense are found in the simplicity of its administration and
the claim that the contributory negligence defense is less costly to
society.
There is no doubt that the contributory negligence defense is an
easier system to operate than is the comparative fault doctrine. The
all-or-nothing approach of the contributory negligence defense
creates relatively simple issues for the jury to resolve. While the
question of whether the plaintiff's conduct constituted contributory
negligence or not may be a difficult one, once that is determined, the
jury's work is exceedingly simple: the plaintiff wins or loses. On the
other hand, the comparative fault doctrine introduces several other
issues that must be resolved by the jury. Not only must the jury
determine whether the plaintiff was at fault, but if it does so determine, it must determine the following issues: (1) the degree of the
plaintiff's culpability as compared to the defendant's (and perhaps
third parties'),' 70 (2) the assignment of a percentage to the respective faults of the parties, and (3) the application of the relative
culpability to the damages sustained in order to apportion the loss.
Critics of comparative fault have identified at least the first two of
these additional issues as difficult, if not impossible, for the jury to
decide.1 7 1 Added to these difficulties is consideration of the administrative problems that necessarily arise in the transition from contributory negligence to comparative fault.
169. See text at notes 16-19 supra.
170. The administration of comparative fault in the context of joint tortfeasors or thirdparty practice has been and is considered to be very complicated. See note 182 infra and
text accompanying the note.
171. See, e.g., V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence §21.1, at 335-36 (1974).
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Proponents of retaining the contributory negligence defense also
claim that the existing system is less costly to society than is comparative fault. 1 72 It has been suggested that comparative fault adds
to societal costs in two ways. First, it causes an increase in automobile insurance rates. 1 7 1 Second, it is claimed that the new issues
raised by comparative fault serve to complicate trials and hence discourage settlements because parties can no longer make accurate
assessments of the value of the cases.' 74
The perceived virtues of the comparative fault doctrine are several.
First, it has been noted that adoption of comparative fault "diminishes the need to employ rules which are designed to ameliorate the
harshness of the contributory negligence rule.'1 7 - Another practical
virtue of comparative fault is that it brings the articulated doctrine in
line with what juries are doing in fact in many cases.' 76 As such, the
courts can provide juries with both guidance and discipline in their
practice of apportioning losses.
While these practical virtues are not insignificant, the courts adopting comparative negligence have focused on more theoretical virtues.
First, the courts have perceived comparative fault to be more in
harmony with the premises of a fault-based system such as negligence. As the Supreme Court of California stated in adopting comparative fault: "The basic objection to the [contributory negligence]
doctrine-grounded on the primal concept that in a system in which
liability is based on fault, the extent of fault should govern the
extent of liability-remains irresistable to reason and all intelligent
notions of fairness.' 77 In addition to being in harmony with the
theoretical bases of negligence, comparative fault, in facilitating
plaintiff recovery, is more consonant with the twentieth century
preference for compensation of accident victims.' 78
Finally, the courts have perceived comparative fault as the
"fairer"1 7 9 system. The Supreme Court of Florida stated this perception best:
172. See id. at 336-38.
173. See Fleming, supra note 72, at 242. This argument has been thoroughly repudiated
in Peck, ComparativeNegligence and Automobile Liability Insurance, 58 Mich. L. Rev. 689,
726-28 (1960).
174. See V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 21.1, at 337 (1974). But see Rosenberg,
Comparative Negligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After" Survey, 36 N.Y. St. B.J. 457,
474-75 (1964).
175. Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1047 (Alaska 1975).
176. See Fleming, supra note 72, at 242-43.
177. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 18 Cal. 3d 804, 812, 532 P.2d 1226, 1231, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 863 (1975).
178. See text at notes 103-04 supra.
179. "In truth, not so much 'reason' (a theoretical concept) as 'fairness' (a value judgment) supports (the adoption of comparative fault] ." Fleming, supra note 72, at 241.
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Perhaps the best argument in favor of the movement from contributory to comparative negligence is that the latter is simply a
more equitable system of determining liability and a more socially
desirable method of loss distribution. The injustice which occurs
when a plaintiff suffers severe injuries as a result of an accident for
which he is only slightly responsible, and is thereby denied any
damages, is readily apparent. The rule of contributory negligence is a
harsh one which either places the burden of a loss for which [two
parties] are responsible upon only one party or relegates to Lady
Luck the determination of the damages for which each of two negligent parties will be liable. When the negligence of more than one
person contributes to the occurrence of an accident, each should pay
of the total damages he has caused the other
the proportion
1

party.

80

The chief defect of the comparative fault doctrine lies in its perceived difficulty in administration. It has been suggested that comparative fault raises issues that will be difficult, if not impossible, for
a jury to determine. " [D] eciding rough degrees of negligence, is one
thing, but deciding precise percentages of negligence requires an
expertise not found in most jurors or judges, if in fact it is possible
for anyone to honestly and intelligently make such decisions." '1 8 1
Furthermore, the conceded complexity of the administration of
comparative fault in the context of cases involving multiple defendants or third-party practice has been advanced as a reason for not
adopting comparative fault., 82
In weighing the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two
systems, courts have had little difficulty in concluding that the comparative fault system is superior. As one commentator noted concerning the adoption of comparative fault by the California Supreme
Court: "It is no doubt more bemusing than surprising that Justice
Sullivan, speaking for the court in Li, regarded the superiority of
comparative negligence over the all-or-nothing rule as so self-evident
as not to call for more than a perfunctory explanation."' 83
Even conceding the superiority of the comparative fault system,
the question remains whether the principle of stare decisis should
prevent the judicial repudiation of the contributory negligence defense
and the substitution of comparative fault. Stare decisis is perceived as
180.
181.
(1974).
182.
(1974).
183.

Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 437 (Fla. 1973).
Syroid v. Albuquerque Gravel Prods. Co., 86 N.M. 235, 238, 522 P.2d 570, 573
See id at 237, 522 P.2d at 572; V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence §21.1 at 336
Fleming, supra note 72, at 241.
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protecting two interests: (1) the reasonable reliance by people on the
preexisting rule, and (2) the conserving of judicial resources by discouraging relitigation of decided issues.1 8 4 Neither of these reasons,
however, supports the retention of the contributory negligence
defense. Certainly, it is unrealistic to believe that people conduct
their affairs in reliance on the contributory negligence defense. 1 85
Moreover, it is unlikely that advocates of comparative fault are going
to be discouraged from their mounting assault on the contributory
negligence defense. The momentum created by the recent judicial
and legislative adoptions of comparative fault appears too strong.
Finally, the failure of the legislators to adopt comparative fault
must be considered. It has been suggested that legislative inaction in
the face of the mounting criticism of the contributory negligence
defense and the repeated opportunities to act constitutes a tacit
approval of the defense.' 86 Courts have often recognized, however,
that legislative silence is inherently ambiguous and a treacherous
basis for conjecture. "As a practical matter, there are a variety of
reasons why bills or ideas do or do not become law and it is not the
role of the courts to guess what legislative silence means."' 8 7
As the foregoing demonstrates, the case for judicial repudiation of
the contributory negligence defense rests on substantial bases. Comparative fault principles are clearly superior to the contributory negligence defense. Neither stare decisis nor the silence of the legislature
militates against judicial repudiation of contributory negligence.
Finally, events which have taken place since the New Mexico
Supreme Court's refusal to repudiate the contributory negligence
defense' 8 8 have seriously undermined the force of the decision. In
Syroid, the supreme court relied, in part, on the fact that only one
court had adopted comparative fault judicially and that five courts
had rejected the invitation.' 8 9 Since that time, however, the balance
has shifted radically. Three more courts have repudiated the contributory negligence defense and have adopted comparative fault.' I0
In addition, two other courts have adopted comparative fault judi184. See H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 587-88 (tent. ed. 1958).
-, 530 P.2d 630, 632 (1975).
185. See Godfrey v. State, 84 Wash. 2d 959,
-,
256 N.W.2d 400, 420 (1977).
186. See Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585,
187. Id.; see Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 18 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
("ITI o draw any inference of tacit approval from the non-action by Congress is to appeal to
unreality.")
188. Syroid v. Albuquerque Gravel Prods. Co., 86 N.M. 235, 522 P.2d 570 (1974).
189. Id at 236, 522 P.2d at 571.
190. Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1974); Kaatz v.
State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 18 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226,
119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
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cially to reach actions not covered by their comparative fault statutes.1 91 With respect to the five jurisdictions, relied on by the
Syroid court, in which courts had refused to adopt comparative fault
judicially, four of those jurisdictions now have adopted comparative
fault, either by statute1 92 or judicial opinion. 1 93 When Syroid was
decided, only twenty-one jurisdictions had adopted comparative
fault principles.O 94 Presently, thirty-three jurisdictions recognize
comparative fault.1 9
Recently, the New Mexico Supreme Court was presented with an
excellent opportunity to indicate that it recognized that circumstances had changed since Syroid Rather than signaling a different
attitude toward contributory negligence, however, the court expressed continued adherence to the defense. In Commercial Union
Assurance Cos. v. Western Farm Bureau Insurance Cos., 9 6 the court
was called on to construe the meaning of the term "pro rata
share" I I in the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.' 98
The plaintiff's intestate had fallen into a well on the land owned by
the insurance companies' insureds and had died. The plaintiff's claim
was settled and the remaining controversy concerned the respective
responsibilities of the four landowners. One group of landowners
claimed that under the contribution statute, the "pro rata share," for
which joint tortfeasors were responsible, meant equal shares. The
other group of landowners argued that "pro rata share" should be
construed so that "their liability is proportionate to their... interest
in the property."' " Under this reasoning, the group of defendants
whose interest in the property amounted to only twenty percent
ownership would be responsible, under the contribution statute, for
twenty percent of the recovery by the plaintiff.
The supreme court rejected this construction and held that "pro
rata share". "means 'equal shares' when applied to the right of contribution between tenants in common." '2 I0 This conclusion is unremarkable, except for the court's reference to the Syroid decision in
reaching its result.
395 A.2d 843 (1978);
191. See Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 119 N.H. -,
General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
192. North Dakota, Oregon and Utah. See note 35 supra for statutory citations.
193. Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979).
194. See Syroid v. Albuquerque Gravel Prods. Co., 86 N.M. 235, 236-37, 522 P.2d
570, 571-72 (1974).
195. See supra note 35.
196. 18 N.M. St. B. Bull. 830, 830-31 (Nov. 15, 1979).
197. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-3-2 (1978).
198. Id § §41-3-1 to -8.
199. 18 N.M. St. B. Bull. 830, 831 (Nov. 15, 1979).
200. Id.

Winter 1979-80]

COMPARATIVE FAUL T IN N.M.

It is well established that ours is a jurisdiction which adheres to
the doctrine of contributory negligence as a bar to recovery in a tort

action. Syroid v. Albuquerque Gravel Products Co., 86 N.M. 235,
522 P.2d 570 (1974). This is based on the perception that justice is
best served by not comparing degrees of negligence or fault. Id
While the instant case involves the relationship between defendants
inter se rather than between defendants and plaintiffs, the same
principle applies. 2 0 '

The Commercial Union case, of course, involves a question of
statutory construction and, as a question of statutory construction,
the decision of the court appears unquestionably correct. The New
Mexico contribution statute is derived from the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, published in 1939 by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 2 0 2 The 1939
Act contained an optional provision which expressly allowed for
consideration of relative fault in determining "pro rata" shares under
the Act: "When there is such a disproportion of fault among joint
tortfeasors as to render inequitable an equal distribution among them
of the common liability by contribution, the relative degrees of fault
of the joint tortfeasors shall be considered in determining their pro
rata share."' 20 3 This optional provision was not included in the Act,
as adopted in New Mexico.
The New Mexico legislature's rejection of the above-quoted provision, in adopting the Uniform Act, evinces a clear legislative attitude
that by "pro rata," equal shares was intended. This construction is
consistent with the vast majority of cases construing the term.2 04
While the court's decision in Commercial Union may be correct,
its reliance on Syroid in its reasoning seems misplaced. First, the
appellants in Commercial Union did not seek a construction of "pro
rata share" based on relative culpability, but rather based on relative
ownership interest in the property. As such, the relevance of Syroid,
which addresses the merits of apportionment based on relative culpability, is unclear. Second, what was at issue in Syroid was whether
the court would exercise its common law discretion to replace contributory negligence with comparative fault; the issue in Commercial
201. Id
202. See 12 Uniform Laws Annotated, 57, 62 (1975). The 1939 Act was withdrawn in
1955 and a new version was substituted. See id New Mexico adheres to the 1939 version.
203. Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act § 2(4) (1939 version), in 12
Uniform Laws Annotated 57 (1975). The 1955 version of the Act deleted section 2(4) and
in its stead expressly provided that "in determining the pro rata shares ... their relative
degrees of fault shall not be considered ....
" Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act § 2 (1975).
204. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Campbell Roofing & Metal Works, Inc., 352 So. 2d 1316,
1319 (Miss. 1977); W. Prosser, Law of Torts §50, at 310 (4th ed. 1971).
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Union was one of statutory construction and not common law discretion. Finally, the Syroid court held that there would be no apportionment of damages between the parties (plaintiff and defendant) at
fault in an accident. In Commercial Union, apportionment of damages among the parties at fault (all defendants) had been established
and the only question was on what basis apportionment would be
made. As such, it is difficult to see how "the same principle applies"' I in Syroid and Commercial Union. The court's failure to
recognize that the Syroid decision is substantially unrelated to the
issue as posed in Commercial Union suggests that the court failed to
consider carefully the relationship of the two cases or the interests
involved. As such, the Commercial Union dicta need not be read as a
strong or well considered affirmation of the contributory negligence
defense in New Mexico.
Equally unfortunate as the dicta in Commercial Union about the
contributory negligence defense is the opportunity the court missed
to retreat from Syroid The court could have reached the same result
in Commercial Union by confining its reasoning to traditional statutory construction analysis. This would have allowed the court to
reach the desired result and still recognize the substantial change in
circumstances since its Syroid decision. Such an approach would
have had two effects. First, it would have provided the court with a
relatively painless opportunity to signal a more receptive attitude
toward comparative fault. Second, a clear signal by the court could
have had the beneficial impact of nudging the legislature in the direction of comparative fault principles.' 06 Thus, the New York Court
of Appeals' decision in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,2 ° 7 adopting
equitable indemnification based on relative culpability, is recognized
as having moved the New York legislature toward enacting its comparative fault statute.2 0 8 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Hawaii's
205. 18 N.M. St. B. Bull. 830, 831 (Nov. 15, 1979).
206. One commentator has suggested that this role of the court is particularly important
in the area of comparative fault.
The correct perspective therefore is to view the creative judicial role not as
a confrontation but as an assistance to the legislature in the continuous task of
defining and redefining the norms of society. The notorious inertia of the
legislative body, especially in the field of private law, can often be overcome
only as a result of a stimulus from the courts. This "admonitory function" of
prodding the legislature to confront a pressing problem and to decide whether to accept, qualify or reject the court's proposed solution, is illustrated
by several well-known episodes in California and elsewhere.
Fleming, supra note 72, at 275 (footnote omitted).
207. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
208. See 13th Annual Judicial Conference Report on CPLR, in McKinney's 1975 Session
Laws of New York at 1480-81.
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clear signal that it would have been receptive to an argument in favor
of substituting comparative fault for the contributory negligence
defense 20 9 has been characterized as prompting the Hawaii legislature to adopt comparative fault legislation. 2 1 0
At the time Syroid was decided, comparative fault was a minority
rule, albeit a substantial minority. Moreover, judicial adoption of
comparative fault was almost wholly without precedent. The radically altered state of affairs since Syroid presents an entirely different
context within which the issue of judicial adoption must be decided.
Comparative fault is not only a majority rule, but has gained a
momentum that makes its ultimate triumph inevitable. Since Syroid,
the judicial adoption of comparative fault has acquired respectability
and is supported by prestigious precedent. The question no longer
appears to be whether comparative fault will be adopted in New
Mexico, but rather when and how it will be adopted. Given the
superiority of comparative fault over the contributory negligence
defense, adoption of comparative fault at the earliest opportunity
seems appropriate. Moreover, not only is the court an appropriate
agency to accomplish the change, it may be the better agency to do
so. Clearly, the time is ripe for judicial adoption of comparative
fault.

209. See Loui v. Oakley, 50 Hawaii 260, 265 n.5, 438 P.2d 393, 397 n.5 (1968) ("It may
be time to reconsider the applicability of the doctrine of contributory negligence
210. See V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence § 1.5, at 17 (1974).

